GitBook production environment compromised through single sign-on flaw

Why it's major
GitBook treats all customer data as exposed, including every customer's API tokens and integration secrets.
Status
Closed
Disclosed
Updated
Data exposed
Source code, infrastructure secrets, and integration tokens; potentially customer API tokens
Outage
GitBook app and authenticated docs sites, November 2 to 3, 2026

TL;DR: GitBook, a docs platform for technical teams and AI agents, says a threat actor gained unauthorized access to its source code. All GitBook customers' API tokens and integration secrets were potentially exposed, and GitBook rotated every secret.

If you use GitBook

GitBook invalidated all API tokens issued before its final cutoff, revoked all personal API tokens, and rotated the Git Sync keys for GitHub and the GitLab tokens for customers. GitBook asks customers to:

  • Create a new GitBook API token and update existing apps that use the GitBook API.
  • Rotate any third-party API tokens or secrets used to connect other tools to GitBook.
  • Rotate the secrets of any published integrations that use secrets.
  • Regenerate the authenticated access signing key in the GitBook app and update it in your custom backend.
  • Re-authenticate the GitBook MCP server if you use it.
  • Review your environments for the IP addresses 94.183.188.91, 45.139.84.195, and 198.251.83.217.

What happened

The threat actor gained unauthorized access to GitBook's systems on November 2, 2026, by exploiting a flaw in GitBook's single sign-on login flow to create login sessions as GitBook staff. By querying the authentication information of a misconfigured GitHub App integration, the threat actor gained access to GitBook's internal code repositories and a Cloudflare API key. With that key, the threat actor gained access to production secrets granting full infrastructure access through a service account.

The threat actor had access to GitBook's production environment for about 2 hours 45 minutes on November 2, 2026, and about 40 minutes on November 3, 2026. The threat actor accessed GitBook's source code, infrastructure secrets, database credentials, integration tokens, and Git Sync secrets. GitBook customers' API tokens, session signing secrets, documentation sites using authenticated access, connected GitHub and GitLab repositories, and GitBook Assistant questions were potentially exposed.

The threat actor hijacked the first account at one targeted GitBook customer at 12:27 UTC on November 2, 2026. GitBook says it found no evidence that any other customer's content was modified. GitBook says billing information, passwords, and IP addresses were not compromised.

GitBook detected the intrusion through an internal alert at 18:10 UTC on November 2, 2026, and remediated the single sign-on flaw at 19:58 UTC. GitBook disabled every affected service account, taking the GitBook app offline from 20:32 UTC on November 2 to 11:56 UTC on November 3, 2026. GitBook rotated every infrastructure secret and GitBook-managed customer secret, invalidated all existing API tokens, recycled all staging and production nodes, and reversed the compromised service account's actions.

Timeline

  1. N/ASecurity incident resolved

  2. Reported by GitBook on X

    All secrets rotated and GitBook app restored

    Redeployment with new secrets began and all existing API tokens invalidated

  3. Compromised accounts disabled, intrusion contained, and GitBook app taken offline

    Intrusion detected through an internal alert

    Threat actor reached the GitBook production environment

    Threat actor gained access to GitBook staff sessions and source code

    Threat actor hijacked an account at the targeted GitBook customer

Sources

  1. GitBook on Xx.com, Nov 3, 2026, 12:21 UTC
  2. Security incident, November 2026gitbook.com, accessed Nov 4, 2026
  3. GitBook Statusstatus.gitbook.com, accessed Nov 4, 2026
  4. GitBook on Xx.com, Nov 4, 2026, 14:31 UTC
  5. GitBook on Xx.com, Nov 4, 2026, 21:10 UTC